Category Archives: Development in Energy Policy

The landscape of energy policy in the United States is fast moving, and it can be difficult to keep track of all of the developments. I intend to use this article series to highlight news and progress in energy policy, break down the issues, and make clear how those developments might affect you.

Playing Politics with Energy Security: How the Latest Congressional Budget Deal Raids the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

Looking to finally reach a longer-term agreement to avoid an extended federal government shutdown last week, a bipartisan deal was reached in Congress in the early morning of February 9 that would fund the government for the next two years. As the details of the deal get combed over there is plenty to digest, even in just energy-related topics (such as the inclusion of climate-related policy), but one notable part of the budget agreement was the mandate to sell 100 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The stated goal of this move was to help pay for tax cuts and budgetary items elsewhere in the deal, but will that goal be realized or is Congress paying lip service to the idea of fiscal responsibility at the expense of future energy security?



Purpose and typical operation of the SPR

In a previous post, I covered more extensively the background and purpose of the SPR. In short, the SPR is the largest reserve supply of crude oil in the world and is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The SPR was established in the wake of the oil crisis of the late 1970s with the goal of providing a strategic fail-safe for the country’s energy sector– ensuring that oil is reliably available in times of emergency, protecting against foreign threats to cut off trade, and minimizing the effect to the U.S. economy that drastic oil price fluctuations might cause.

In general, decisions regarding SPR withdrawals are made by the President when he or she 1) “has found drawdown and sale are required by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States under the international energy program,” 2) determines that an emergency has significantly reduced the worldwide oil supply available and increased the market price of oil in such a way that would cause “major adverse impact on the national economy,” 3) sees the need to resolve internal U.S. disruptions without the need to declare “a severe energy supply interruption, or 4) sees it a suitable way to comply with international energy agreements. These drawdowns, following the intended purpose of the SPR, are limited to a maximum of 30 million barrels at a time.

Outside of these standard withdrawals, the Secretary of the DOE can also direct test sales of up to 5 million barrels, SPR oil can be sold out on a loan to companies attempting to respond to small supply disruptions, or Congress can enact laws to authorize SPR non-emergency sales intended to respond to small supply disruptions and/or raise funds for the government. This last type of sale is what Congress authorized with the passing of the budget deal (see the previous article on the SPR to read more about how the SPR oil actually gets sold).

Source

While selling SPR oil to raise funds is legislatively permitted, this announced sale of 100 million barrels (15% of the balance of the SPR) is an unprecedented amount– the biggest non-emergency sale in history according to ClearView Energy Partners. More concerning than the amount of oil to be sold, though, is the ambiguity behind what exactly the sale of SPR oil will fund. Historically, an unwritten and bipartisan rule was that the SPR was not to be used as a ‘piggy bank’ to fund political measures. However, that resistance to using the SPR as a convenient way to raise money (for causes like infrastructure or medical research) was waned as Congress has faced the perennial opposition to raising taxes and the need for new sources of income.

Lisa Murkowski, Chairwoman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, has echoed these frustrations about how the funds from the SPR sell-off will be used. When asked how Congress would spend the money, she simply replied it would be spent on “whatever they want. That’s why I get annoyed.” Despite the history of the SPR being an insurance policy for the U.S. energy sector and economy from threats of embargo from foreign nations, natural disasters, and unexpected and drastic changes in the market, the inclusion of SPR sales in this budget is just further indication of Congress trading out energy security and buying into other priorities. Taking the issue a step further, once the oil from the SPR is sold off, it likely becomes that much harder to convince Congress in the future to find the money to rebuild stocks with any additional oil stocks that might become necessary, both because the trajectory of oil prices is always climbing and thus naturally becomes more expensive to do so over time and because getting Congressional approval for new spending will always be more difficult politically than ‘doing nothing’ and just keeping SPR stocks at their current levels.

But is this selling of the SPR oil really in the name of deficit reduction and fiscal responsibility? Will the sale of this oil make an appreciable difference and help balance out the budget that Congress agreed to at (or, rather, past) the eleventh hour?

Crunching the numbers

Ignoring the previously authorized SPR sales, this budget deal alone included directive for DOE to sell 100 million barrels of oil from the SPR. What level of funds would this actually raise, and would it be enough to make a dent in the deficit? At current prices of crude oil that have hovered in the $60 per barrel (b) range, the sale would translate to about $6 billion– but the actual number depends on the price at which the oil gets sold, an uncertain number because the oil is being sold over the next 10 years and oil prices are notoriously variable.

We can make a certain degree of estimates based on the outlook of crude oil prices going forward (acknowledging at the outset the significant uncertainty that any forecast inherently assumes, especially in the oil markets that are affected by outside factors like government policy and geopolitical relations). To get a rough idea, though, we can look at the recently released 2018 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO2018) from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) which projects energy production, consumption, and prices under a variety of different scenarios (such as high vs. low investment in oil and gas technology, high vs. low oil prices, and high vs. low economic growth).

Source (Click to enlarge)

Brent crude oil (representative of oil on the European markets) starts at about $53/b in 2018 and goes up to about $89/b by 2027 in the ‘reference case’ (going from $27/b to $36/b in the low oil price scenario and $80/b to $174/b in the high oil price scenario). Similarly, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil (representative of the U.S. markets) starts at about $50/b in 2018 and goes to $85/b in 2027 in the ‘reference case’ ($243/b to $33/b in the low oil price scenario and $48/b to $168/b in the high oil price scenario). These figures present a pretty wide range of possibilities, but that is unfortunately the nature of oil prices in today’s climate. Further, EIA does unofficially consider these ranges to be akin to the 95% confidence intervals between which the actual prices are almost assured to be found, so we can still find value in these prices as the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case scenarios.

For simplicity’s sake, we can assume this 100 million barrels sold will be sold in equal chunks of 10 million barrels per year from 2018 to 2027 (though the actual sale will certainly not follow this neat order, but the assumption will get us in the approximate range). In the below charts, see the amount of funds raised from this SPR sale assuming the actual sale price is the average of Brent and WTI prices in the AEO2018 reference case compared with using the price of Brent in the high oil price scenario (the largest total oil price in any side case) and the price of WTI in the low oil price scenario (the lowest oil price in all of the side cases). The top chart tracks the amount of money raised in each of the 10 years while the bottom chart then shows the cumulative money raised in these three scenarios over the course of the decade.

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As shown, the low oil price scenario raises between $226 million and $326 million every year for a decade, totaling just shy of $3 billion in funds. In the high price scenario, the annual amount brought in is between $800 million and $1.7 billion per year, totaling about $14 billion in funds. In the reference case, the one that is most likely (though not at all assured) to be representative, each year the selling of SPR oil would bring in between $512 million and $868 million for a total of $7.5 billion in funds.

Now let’s be clear about one thing–raising somewhere between $3 billion and $14 billion is a lot of money. But in the context of this budget that was passed and the rising deficit of the federal government, how much of a dent will this fundraising through the sale of SPR oil really make?

The budget deal will add $320 billion to deficits over the next decade, which is almost $420 billion when factoring in interest according to the Congressional Budget Office. That massive increase in spending, an average of $42 billion per year, makes the funds from the SPR sale look like pocket change:

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Both the sale of SPR oil and the impact of this budget will be felt over the next 10 years, meaning these dollar figure present very apt comparisons. At the end of the decade, the high oil price scenario shows that SPR oil sales will only account for 3.4% of the deficit increase, while the reference case would account for 1.8% of the deficit increase and the low oil price scenario would only account for 0.7% of the deficit increase. Since the deficit would increase over the course of 10 years, another way to think of it is that the selling of SPR oil would account for 124 days of the deficit increase in the high oil price scenario, while the reference case would account for 65 days of the deficit increase and the low oil price scenario would account for 26 days of the deficit increase.

Outside of the increase to the deficit, the discretionary spending from the budget increase are to be $296 billion over the next two years (not including money given immediately to disaster spending, healthcare, and tax cuts). The SPR oil sale translates to between 1.0 and 4.8% of the discretionary spending increase or 7 to 35 days of the two years worth of spending increases.

Lastly, after accounting for this latest Congressional budget agreement, the CBO projects the federal deficit will increase to $1.2 trillion in 2019. If the sale of SPR oil is attempted to be pushed as a degree of fiscal responsibility in the wake of this budget deal, it is worth noting that the authorized sale of the SPR oil would only account for 1.2% of the total federal deficit in the best case scenario of high oil prices (0.2% in the low oil price scenario)– a metaphorical drop in the bucket (though for those curious, it’s actually significantly more than a literal drop in the bucket!).

What’s it all mean?

Buckets get filled drop by drop all the time, and it inherently requires many drops to fill up that bucket. So in this metaphor, each drop need not be disparaged for not being larger and doing more to fill up the bucket as it is the aggregate effect we should care about. Despite that truth, it is still fair to bring up whether the sacrifices required to gather that ‘drop’ were worthwhile. Going back to the origin and history of the SPR, Congress selling off large portions of the stocks of oil was never meant to fund ambiguous budgetary measures.

This 100 million barrels to be sold should also not be taken without the context of the sales already authorized by Congress last year that will also become reality in the next decade. Combined with the previously mandated sales, after this budget deal the SPR will be left with just over 300 million barrels of oil— about half of what it had been. So the negative side of this is that Congress appears ready and willing to gut the SPR. However the other side is that, because of the U.S. shale oil boom and other factors, the amount of net imports of oil and oil products to the United States has been dropping significantly. In the context of decreasing net imports, the amount of SPR stock measured in terms of ‘days of supply of total petroleum net imports’ has seen a comparable rise. What this means is that because the United States has become less dependent on foreign oil, less oil needs to be stored in the SPR to provide the same amount of import coverage.

Source (Click to enlarge)

In the wake of this budget passing and the previously announced SPR oil sales, many energy analysts came out to call these moves short-sighted at best, citing the following among the many reasons:

Because the budget that was passed was over 600 pages and was voted on before most people (or anyone) would realistically have a chance to read it, it’s yet to be clear what part of the budget will cause the most noise. But in terms of this surprising move by Congress with respect to the SPR, the questions to wrestle with become the following: Is it wise to sell off our oil insurance policy that might be needed in future tough times just because things are looking good for the present U.S. oil market? Is the financial benefit of reducing SPR oil stocks by such a significant amount  worth paying off a couple of weeks to a couple of months of the increased deficit, or is it possible that such a sale is only paying lip service to fiscal responsibility that allows politicans to point to an impressive sounding source of funds (up to $14 billion!) when in reality it doesn’t move the needle much (a maximum of 3% of the increase in deficit)?

Sources and additional reading

2018 Annual Energy Outlook: Energy Information Administration

America’s (not so) Strategic Petroleum Reserve: The Hill

Budget deal envisions largest stockpile sale in history: The Hill

CBO Finds Budget Deal Will Cost $320 Billion: Congressional Budget Office

DOE in Focus: Strategic Petroleum Reserve

Harvey, Irma show value of Strategic Petroleum Reserve, energy experts say: Chron

Petroleum reserve sell-off sparks pushback: E&E Daily

U.S. Looks To Sell 15% Of Strategic Petroleum Reserve: OilPrice.com

U.S. SPR Stocks as Days of Supply of Total Petroleum Net Imports: Energy Information Administration

Weekly U.S. Ending Stocks of Crude Oil in SPR: Energy Information Administration

Why the U.S. Shouldn’t Sell Off the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Wall Street Journal

 

About the author: Matt Chester is an energy analyst in Washington DC, studied engineering and science & technology policy at the University of Virginia, and operates this blog and website to share news, insights, and advice in the fields of energy policy, energy technology, and more. For more quick hits in addition to posts on this blog, follow him on Twitter @ChesterEnergy.  

Debunking Trump’s Claim of “War on Beautiful, Clean Coal” Using Graphs

In President Trump’s first State of the Union Address last week, a wide range of topics in the Administration’s agenda were covered extensively while energy was largely pushed to the side. Trump did include two sentences on his self-described push for “American Energy Dominance,” and these two sentences sent wonks in the energy industry into a frenzy on social media:

“We have ended the war on American energy. And we have ended the war on beautiful, clean coal.”

My Twitter feed lit up with various energy journalists and market watchers who noted the impressiveness that just 18 words over two sentences could contain so many misleading, or outright false, claims.

Source

As one of those energy reporters who immediately took to Twitter with my frustration, I thought I would follow up on these statements last week with arguments why the claims of ‘clean coal’ and the supposed ‘war’ on it do not reflect the reality the Trump Administration would have you believe, and I’ll do so with just a handful of graphs.



What is ‘clean coal’?

As a pure fuel, coal is indisputably the ‘dirtiest’ energy source in common use in the power sector, accounting for about 100 kilograms (kg) of carbon dioxide (CO2) per million British thermal unit (MMBtu) of energy output. This output is notably larger than other major energy sources, including natural gas (about 50 kg/MMBtu), petroleum products like propane and gasoline (about 60 to 70 kg/MMBtu), and carbon neutral fuels like nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, and solar. In the face of the scientific consensus on CO2’s contributions to climate change, many have noted that one of the best actions that can be taken in the energy industry is to shift away from coal to fuels that emit less CO2— which has definitively given coal a dirty reputation.

The premise of ‘clean coal’ is largely a PR push (literally invented by an advertising agency in 2008)– an ingenious marketing term, but one that does not have much in the way of legs. When you hear politicians talking about ‘clean coal,’ it is usually referring to one or more of the following suite of technologies:

  • Washing coal before it’s burned to remove soil and rock and thus reduce ash and weight of the coal;
  • Using wet scrubbers on the gas generated from burning coal to remove the sulfur dioxide from being released;
  • Various carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies for new or existing coal plants that intervene in the coal burning process (either pre-combustion or post-combustion) to capture up to 90% of the CO2 produced from its burning and then sending it miles underground for permanent storage instead of releasing it into the atmosphere; or
  • Anything done to the coal-fired power plant to increase the efficiency of the entire process of generating electricity (e.g., the 700 Megawatt supercritical coal plant in West Virginia that is so efficient it reportedly releases 20% less CO2 than older coal plants) and reduce the overall emissions.

Source

When most in the energy industry discuss ‘clean coal’ technology, they are typically referring to CCS. However it should be noted that Trump did not mention CCS by name in this (or any) speech. Some analysts have noted that the White House’s attempts to cut CCS funding and send the Secretaries of the Department of Energy (DOE) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to supercritical coal plants are not-so-subtle hints that the Trump Administration’s preferred type of ‘clean coal’ is improving the efficiency of coal-fired generation. Even Bob Murray, the influential coal magnate, has written to the President to indicate his contempt for CCS, calling it a ‘pseudonym for no coal,‘ echoing the concerns of many proponents of coal that CCS is being pushed as the only ‘clean coal’ option so that if/when it fails (due to economic impracticalities) it would be the death knell of coal-fired generation altogether.

So regardless of which ‘clean coal’ technology the Trump Administration supports, issues remain. With regard to wet scrubbers, coal washing, and general plant efficiency improvements, the reductions in CO2 emissions are not nearly enough to compete with cleaner fuels. Even if all coal plants could be made 20% more efficient (and less reduce CO2 emissions by about 20%) like the West Virginia supercritical plant, which would be a massive undertaking, it would still result in coal generation being among the dirtiest energy in the country.

With regard to CCS, not only is the cost one of the biggest issues (which will be looked at in more detail later), but it does not remove all the pollutants from burning coal. Even with the most effective CCS capturing 90% of CO2 emissions, that leaves 10% of CO2 making its way into the atmosphere along with the other notable pollutants in coal gas (including mercury, nitrogen oxide, and other poisonous contaminants). When compared with the carbon neutral energy sources increasingly gaining ground in the United States, coal plants with CCS still hardly seem clean.

Again, the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) listing of carbon dioxide emissions coefficients shows the CO2 emissions associated with different fuel types when burned as fuel. As previously noted, coal is the far-away leader on CO2 emissions coefficients as a pure fuel. In DOE analysis of future-built generation (an analysis that focuses on the costs and values of different types of power plants to be built in the future, which will come up again in more detail later), the only type of coal generation even considered is coal with either 30% or 90% carbon sequestration, with 90% being the technological ceiling and 30% being the minimum example of new coal-fired generation that would still be compliant with the Clean Air Act. The below graph, our first in demonstrating the issues with claims of a ‘war on beautiful, clean coal,’ plots the CO2 coefficients of major fuel sources in the U.S. power sector, including coal using no CCS, 30% CCS, or 90% CCS. Existing power plants do not have the same requirements under the Clean Air Act, so they might still be producing CO2 at the far right of the ‘coal’ bar (indeed, last year almost 70% of U.S. coal was delivered to power plants that are at least 38 years old meaning they are likely far from the most efficient coal plants out there). Coal plants that are touted as ‘clean’ because of their up to 20% increases in efficiency would still find themselves in the same (or greater) range of emissions as 30% CCS coal plants, while 90% CCS coal plants appear to the be the only ones that can compete with other fuels environmentally (though it comes at a potentially prohibitive cost, which will show up in a later graph).

Note that the data for these CO2 emission coefficients come from this EIA listing. The lines for 30%/90% CCS are not just drawn 30%/90% lower, but rather account for the presence of CCS requiring more energy and thus cause a dip in efficiency– this graph uses the rough efficiency drop assumed for CCS plants in this International Energy Agency report

These numbers paint a scary picture of coal and are the source of what causes many energy prognosticators to scoff at the utterance of ‘beautiful, clean coal,’ though it is important to be clear that these numbers don’t tell the whole story. While nuclear and renewable energy sources do not emit any fuel-related CO2, they are not completely carbon neutral over their lifetimes, as the building, operation, and maintenance of nuclear and renewable generation plants (as with any utility-scale generation source) all have their own non-zero effect on the environment. However, since fuel makes up the vast majority of carbon output in the electricity generation sector, any discussion of clean vs. dirty energy must return to these numbers.

Further, the separation of dispatchable vs. non-dispatchable technologies (i.e., energy sources whose output can be varied to follow demand vs. those that are tied to the availability of an intermittent resource) shown in the above graph is important. Until batteries and other energy-storage technologies reach a point technologically and economically to assist renewable (non-dispatchable) energy sources fill in the times when the energy resource is unavailable, dispatchable technologies will always be necessary to plug the gaps. So regardless of what drawbacks might exist for each of the dispatchable technologies, CO2 emissions and overall costs included, at least some dispatchable energy  will still be critical in the coming decades.

Who is orchestrating the ‘war on coal’?

Even with the knowledge that coal will never truly be ‘clean,’ the question then becomes why haven’t the advancements in coal energy that is cleaner and more efficient than traditional coal-fired plants become more prominent in the face of climate and environmental concerns? The common talking point from the Trump Administration is that there is a biased war on coal being orchestrated, and the actions of President Trump to roll back regulation is the only way to fight back against this unjust onslaught that the coal industry is facing. But again, from where is this onslaught coming?

The answer to this question is actually pretty easy– it’s not regulation that is causing coal to lose its place as the king of the U.S. power sector, it’s competition from more affordable energy sources (that also happen to be cleaner). The two charts below demonstrate this pointedly, with the left graph showing the fuel makeup of the U.S. electric power sector since 1990 along with the relative carbon intensity of the major CO2-emitting fuel sources, while the right graph shows what’s happened to the price of each each major fuel type over the past decade. The carbon intensity shown on the left graph is even more indicative than the first graph above in detailing the actual degree to which each fuel is ‘clean’ as it factors in the efficiency of plants using the fuel and indicates the direct CO2 emissions relative to electricity delivered to customers.

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Note that the costs are taken from this EIA chart, with coal taken from fossil steam, natural gas taken from gas turbine and small scale, and wind/solar taken as the gas turbine and small scale price after removing the cost of fuel. Electric power generation and carbon emission data taken from this EIA source

Just from analysing these two graphs, a number of key observations and conclusions can be made about the electric power sector and coal’s evolving place in it:

  • In 1990, coal accounted for almost 1.6 million Gigawatt-hours (GWh) of power generation, representing 52% of the sector. By 2016, that figure dropped to 1.2 million GWh or 30% of U.S. power generation.
  • Over that same time period, natural gas went from less than 400,000 GWh (12%) to almost 1.4 million GWh (34%); nuclear went from less than 600,000 GWh (19%) to over 800 GWh (20%), and combined wind and solar went from 3,000 GWh (0.1%) to over 260,000 GWh (6%).
  • While the coal sector’s carbon intensity hovered around 1.0 kg of CO2 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity produced from 1990 to 2016 (even as CCS and other ‘clean coal’ technologies began to break into the market), natural gas dropped from 0.6 kg CO2/kWh to less than 0.5 kg CO2/kWh, while nuclear, wind, and solar do not have any emissions associated with their generation (again noting that there are some emissions associated with the operation and maintenance of these technologies, but they are neglible compared with fossil fuel-related emissions). The drop in natural gas carbon intensity combined with coal losing ground to natural gas, nuclear, and renewable energy led the electric power sector’s overall average carbon intensity to drop from over 0.6 kg CO2/kWh to less than 0.5 kg CO2/kWh.
  • While the narrative some would prefer to push is that coal is getting replaced because of a regulatory ‘war on coal,’ the real answer comes from the right graph where the cost to generated a kWh of electricity for coal increased notably from 2006 to 2016. Meanwhile, natural gas (which started the decade more expensive than coal) experienced a drastic drop in price to become cheaper than coal (thanks to advances in natural gas production technologies) while the low cost of nuclear fuel and ‘free’ cost of wind and solar allowed these energy sources to start and remain well below the total cost of coal generation. This natural, free-market competition from other energy sources, thanks to increasingly widespread availability and ever decreasing prices, is what put pressure on coal and ultimately led to natural gas dethroning coal as the predominant energy source in the U.S. power sector.

What these two graphs show is that the energy market is naturally evolving, there is no conspiratorial ‘war’ on coal. The technologies behind solar and wind are improving, getting cheaper, and becoming more prolific for economic, environmental, and accessibility reasons. Nuclear power is holding strong in its corner of the electricity market. Natural gas, more than any other, is getting cheaper and much more prominent to the U.S. power sector (while having the benefit of about half the CO2 emissions of coal), which is what has made it the natural ‘enemy’ of coal of the past decade or two. All that’s to say, the only ‘war on coal’ that’s been widespread in recent memory is a capitalistic, free-market war that will naturally play out when new energy sources are available at cheaper prices and contribute significantly less to climate change.

Will Trump policies reverse the course of coal in the United States?

Going back to the statement from Trump’s State of the Union Address, he claimed that his Administration had ended the war on clean coal. As stated previously, there was never an outward war on coal that was hindering the fuel. Even still, the main policy change from the Trump Administration with regard to coal was to repeal the Clean Power Plan (CPP) that aimed to cut carbon emissions from power generation.  However, many analysts predicted that would not change the current trends, as repealing the CPP does nothing to reverse the pricing pattern of the fuels. Indeed, this week EIA released its Annual Energy Outlook for 2018 and confirmed the tough future that coal generation has compared with natural gas and renewables– both with and without the CPP. While the CPP reduces the projections of coal generation, it doesn’t move the needle all that much and natural gas and renewables are still shown to surpass coal.

Source

So the major policy decision of the Trump Administration with respect to coal generation doesn’t appear to reverse the course of coal’s future. Again, this conclusion isn’t terribly surprising considering the economics of coal compared with other fuels. EIA projects the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for different type of new power generation (assumed to be added in 2022) which serves to show the relative costs to install new power generation. In the same analysis, EIA projects Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation (LACE), which can be thought of as the ‘value’ of the new generation to the grid (for more detailed description in the calculations and uses of these measures, read through the full report). When the LACE is equal or greater than the LCOE, that is in indication of a financially viable type of power to build (evaluated over the lifetime of the plant). So by looking at the relative costs (LCOE) of each power type and whether or not they are exceeded by their values (LACE), we can get a clear picture of what fuel types are going to be built in the coming years (and to continue the focus on whether coal or other fuels are ‘clean,’ let’s put the economics graph side-by-side with the CO2 emissions coefficients):

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Note that the source of the data on the left graph is the EIA Levelized Cost of Electricity analysis, with the ends of the boxes representing the minimum and maximum values and the line in the middle representing the average– the difference in possible values comes from variations in power plants, such as geographic differences in availability and cost of fuel. Also note that, counter-intuitively, EIA’s assumed costs for 30% CCS are actually greater than for 90% CCS because the 30% CCS coal plants would ‘still be considered a high emitter relative to other new sources and thus may continue to face potential financial risk if carbon emissions controls are further strengthened. Again, the data for the right graph takes CO2 emission coefficients from this EIA listing by fuel type

Looking at these graphs, we can see that the cost of new coal generation (regardless of CCS level) not only exceeds the value it would bring to the grid, but also largely exceeds the cost of natural gas, nuclear, geothermal, biomass, onshore wind, solar photovoltaic (PV), and hydroelectric power (all of which emit less CO2 than coal). Thus even in the scenario where 90% of carbon is captured by CCS (which allows it to be ‘cleaner’ than natural gas and biomass), it still comes at a significant cost premium compared with most of the other fuel types. These are the facts that are putting the hurt on the coal industry, not any policy-based ‘war on coal.’ Even the existing tax credits that are given to renewable energy generation are minor when looking at the big picture, as the below graph (which repeats the above graph but removes the renewable tax credits from the equation) shows. Even if these tax credits are allowed to expire, the renewable technology would still outperform coal both economically and environmentally.

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The last graphical rebuttal to President Trump’s statement on energy and coal during the State of the Union that I’ll cite comes from Tyler Norris, a DOE adviser under President Obama:

Source

As pointed out by Norris and other energy journalists chiming in during the State of the Union address, if the goal were to expand ‘clean coal,’ then the Trump Administration’s budget is doing the opposite by taking money away from DOE programs that support the research and development of the technology. In fact, at the end of last week a leaked White House budget proposal indicated even further slashes to the DOE budget that would further hamper the ability of the government to give a leg up to the development of ‘clean coal’ technology. Any war on energy is coming from the Trump Administration, and any battle that coal is fighting is coming from the free market of cheaper and cleaner fuels.

Sources and additional reading

20 Years of Carbon Capture and Storage: International Energy Agency

Annual Energy Outlook 2018: Energy Information Administration

Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 2006 through 2016: Energy Information Administration

Carbon Dioxide Emissions Coefficients: Energy Information Administration

Did Trump End the War on Clean Coal? Fact-Checking the President’s State of the Union Claim: Newsweek

How Does Clean Coal Work? Popular Mechanics

How much carbon dioxide is produced per kilowatthour when generating electricity with fossil fuels? Energy Information Administration

Is There Really Such a Thing as Clean Coal? Big Think

Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2017: Energy Information Administration

Trump touts end of ‘war on beautiful, clean coal’ in State of the Union: Utility Dive

Trump’s Deceptive Energy Policy: New York Times

What is clean coal technology: How Stuff Works

About the author: Matt Chester is an energy analyst in Washington DC, studied engineering and science & technology policy at the University of Virginia, and operates this blog and website to share news, insights, and advice in the fields of energy policy, energy technology, and more. For more quick hits in addition to posts on this blog, follow him on Twitter @ChesterEnergy.  

Drilling in the Alaskan Arctic National Wildlife Reserve vs. Renewable Energy: The Drilling Debate, Economic and Environmental Effects, and How Solar and Wind Energy Investment Would Compare

In a first for this blog, the focus of this post comes directly from a reader request– so I’ll let this person’s words speak for themselves:

With Congress recently passing a bill allowing for drilling of oil and gas in Alaska’s Arctic National Wilidlife Refuge (ANWR), it got me curious (as a citizen of the sun-rich American Southwest) how much land would need to be covered in solar panels in order to generate the same amount of energy that would be found in these potential new oil and gas drilling sites. Obviously each energy source would have their individual costs to consider, but I am curious as to how efficient and cost-effective it would be to drill in the Alaskan arctic if there are cleaner and cheaper alternatives– it seems covering up the deserts of New Mexico and Arizona could be preferable to potentially harming some of the Alaskan environment and wildlife. Is drilling in this new area even an efficient and safe way for us to get additional oil and gas?
– Case

I loved the thoughtfulness and importance of this question and was inspired to immediately jump into research (also I was so happy to have a suggestion from an outside perspective– so if you read this or any of my other posts and you get inspired or curious, please do reach out to me!). From my perspective, this overall inquiry can be broken down into five questions to be answered individually:

  1. What is ANWR and what exactly did Congress authorize with regards to drilling in ANWR?
  2. How much potential oil and gas would be produced from the drilling?
  3. What are the economics associated with extracting and using oil and gas from ANWR?
  4. What are the environmental effects of that drilling?
  5. Can we do better to just install renewable energy resources instead of drilling in ANWR? How much capacity in renewable sources would be needed? How would the costs of renewable installations compare with the ANWR drilling?



Question 1: What is ANWR and what exactly did Congress authorize with regards to drilling in ANWR?

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, or ANWR, has long been a flash point topic of debate, viewed by proponents of oil and gas drilling as a key waiting to unlock fuel and energy independence in the United States, while opponents argue that such drilling unnecessarily threatens the habitat of hundreds of species of wildlife and the pristine environment that’s been protected for decades. ANWR is a 19.6-million-acre section of northeastern Alaska, long considered one of the most pristine and preserved nature refuges in the United States. Having stayed untouched for so long has allowed the native population of polar bears, caribou, moose, wolverines, and more to flourish. ANWR was only able to remain pristine due to oil and gas drilling in the refuge being banned in 1980 by the Alaskan National Interest Conservation Act, with Section 1002 of that act deferring decision on the management of oil and gas exploration on a 1.5-million-acre coastal plane area of ANWR known to have the greatest potential for fossil fuels. This stretch of ANWR has since become known as the ‘1002 Area.’

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This 1002 Area of ANWR is at the center of the ANWR debate, as Presidents and Congresses have had to fight various bills over the past couple decades that sought to lift those drilling bans, doing so successfully until recently. At the end of 2017, with Republicans (who have long been pushing to allow such oil and gas exploration in ANWR) controlling the White House and both Houses of Congress, decisive action was finally made. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, led by Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, voted in November to approve a bill that would allow oil and gas exploration, with that bill ultimately getting attached to and approved along with the Senate’s tax-reform package in December, with the justification for that attachment being that the drilling would help pay for the proposed tax cuts.

Specifically, the legislation that ended the ban on oil and gas drilling in ANWR did so by mandating two lease sales (of at least 400,000 acres each) in the 1002 Area over the next 10 years. The government’s royalties on these leases are expected to generate over $2 billion, half of which would go to Alaska and the other half to the federal government.

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Question 2: How much potential oil and gas would be produced from the drilling?

This really is the million dollar (or, rather, billion dollar) question, because part of the issue is that no one really knows how much fossil fuel is hidden deep under ANWR. The situation is a bit of a catch-22, as you cannot get a good idea for how much oil there is without drilling, but under the drilling ban you cannot explore how much there is. A number of surface geology and seismic exploration surveys have been conducted, and the one exploratory drilling project by oil companies was allowed in the mid-1980s, but the results of that study remain a heavily guarded secret to this day (although National Geographic has previously reported that the results of the test were disappointing). In contrast even to regions bordering ANWR in Alaska that have the benefit of exploratory drilling, any analysis of the 1002 Area is restricted to field studies, well data, and analysis of seismic data.

The publicly available estimates from the 1998 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (the most recent one done on the 1002 Area) indicate there are between 4.3 billion and 11.8 billion barrels of technically recoverable crude oil products and between 3.48 and 10.02 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of technically recoverable natural gas in the coastal plain of ANWR. Even though there is that much oil and gas that is technically recoverable, though, does not mean that all of it would be economical to recover. A 2008 report by the Department of Energy (DOE), based on the 1998 USGS survey and acknowledging the uncertainty in the USGS numbers given that the technology for the USGS survey is now outdated, estimates that development of the 1002 Area would actually result in 1.9 to 4.3 billion barrels of crude oil extracted over a 13-year period (while the rest of the oil would not be cost effective to extract). The report also estimates that peak oil production would range from 510,000 barrels per day (b/d) to 1.45 million b/d. These estimates must be taken with a grain of salt, however, as not only are they based on the use of now-outdated technology, but the technology to extract oil is also greatly improved. These technology improvements mean the USGS estimates could be low, but on the other side, oil exploration is always a lottery and recent exploration near ANWR has been disappointing. That’s all to say, current estimate are just that, estimates– which makes the weighing of pros and cons of drilling all the more complicated.

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The 2008 DOE report did not assess the potential extraction of natural gas reserves (note that much of the analysis and debate surrounding ANWR drilling focuses mainly on the oil reserves and not the natural gas reserves, likely because the oil is more valuable, cost-effective to extract, and in demand. Where relevant, I will include the facts and figures of natural gas in addition to the oil, but note that certain parts of this analysis will have to center just on the oil based the the availability of data).

To put that in context, the total U.S. proved crude oil reserves at the end of 2015 were 35.2 billion barrels, so the technically recoverable oil in the 1002 Area would account for 12 to 34% of total U.S. oil reserves. At the end of 2015 the U.S. proved reserves of natural gas were 324.3 TCF, making the technically recoverable natural gas in the 1002 Area equal to 1 to 3% of total U.S. natural gas reserves. Put another way, the the technically recoverable oil reserves would equal 218 to 599 days worth of U.S. oil consumption (using the 2016 daily average), while the natural gas reserves would equal 47 to 134 days worth of U.S. natural gas consumption (using the 2016 daily average).

Question 3: What are the economics associated with extracting and using oil and gas from ANWR?

In addition to the push towards ‘energy independence’ (i.e., minimizing the need for oil imports from foreign nations where prices and availability can be volatile), a main motivation for drilling in the 1002 Area of ANWR is the economic benefits it could bring. In addition to the $1 billion for the Alaskan government and $1 billion for the federal government from the leasing of the land, Senator Murkowski boasted that the eventual oil and gas production would bring in more than $100 billion for the federal treasury through federal royalties on the oil extracted from the land.

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However, these theorized economic benefits to drilling is strongly disputed by the plan’s opponents, with president of the Wilderness Society noting that ‘the whole notion that you are going to trim a trillion-dollar deficit with phony oil revenue is just a cynical political ploy.’ When digging into the numbers more closely, the $1 billion to the federal government from leasing the land would end up offsetting less than 0.1% of the $1.5 trillion in tax  cuts to which the drilling provision was attached (while some analyses question whether the land would gather that much in reality, noting the estimates assume oil leases selling for 10 times what they sold for a year ago when domestic oil was scarcer and more expensive).

Outside of the federal revenue, the money coming to the Alaskan government would be even more influential, which is why the charge to open ANWR to drilling is often led by Alaskan policymakers. In fact, while a majority of Americans oppose drilling in ANWR, most Alaskans are cited as supporting responsible oil exploration. While that may seem counterintuitive, the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation explains that “a clear majority of the North Slope support responsible development in ANWR; they should have the same rights to economic self-determination as people in the rest of the United States.

In addition to the money raised by the government is the potential economic benefit to the country from the extraction of the oil. According to the previously mentioned 2008 DOE report, the extraction of the ANWR oil would reduce the need for the United States to import $135 to $327 billion of oil. This shift would have a positive benefit to the U.S. balance of trade by that same amount, but the reduction of reliance on imported foreign oil would only drop from 54% to 49%, and the effect on global oil prices would be small enough to be neutralized by modest collective action by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), meaning U.S. consumers would likely not see an effect on their energy prices.

The last economic consideration would be the worth of the oil and the cost to the companies doing the drilling to extract and bring to market the oil products. A study done by the researchers at Elsevier found that the worth of the oil in the 1002 Area of ANWR is $374 billion, while the cost to extract and bring to market would be $123 billion. The difference, $251 billion, would be the profits to the companies— which theoretically would generate social/economic benefits through means such as industry rents, tax revenues, and jobs created and sustained.

So in short, the decision about whether or not to drill in ANWR has the potential to cause a significant economic effect for the federal and Alaskan state governments, the oil companies who win the leasing auctions, and those who might be directly impacted from increased profits to the oil and gas companies. As with all analytical aspects of ANWR drilling, though, the exact scale of that effect is hotly debated and subject to the great uncertainty surrounding how much oil and gas are technically recoverable from the 1002 Area. Further, the amount of oil that is economically sound to recover and put into the market (not to mention the price oil and gas companies would be willing to spend on leasing this land) is entirely depending on the ever-fluctuating and difficult to forecast price of crude oil, adding further potential variability to the estimates.

Question 4: What are the environmental effects of that drilling?

As previously noted, drilling in ANWR is an especially sensitive environmental  subject because it is one of the very few places left on Earth that remains pristine and untouched by humanity’s polluted fingerprint. The vast and beautiful land has been described by National Geographic as ‘primordial wilderness that stretches from spruce forests in the south, over the jagged Brooks Range, onto gently sloping wetlands that flow into the ice-curdled Beaufort Sea’ and is often called ‘America’s Serengeti.’ In terms of wildlife, ANWR is noted as fertile ground for its dozens of species of land and marine mammals (notably caribou and polar bears) and hundreds of species of migratory birds from six continents and each of the 48 contiguous United States.

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While the exact environmental effects of oil exploration and drilling are not known for certain, the potential ills that can befall the environment and wildlife in ANWR include the following:

  • Oil development is found to be very disruptive to the area’s famed porcupine caribou, potentially threatening their existence (an existence which the native Gwich’in people depend upon for survival), with the Canadian government even issuing a statement in the wake of the ANWR drilling bill reminding the U.S. government of the 1987 bilateral agreement to conserve the caribou and their habitat;
  • ANWR consists of a biodiversity that’s so unique globally that the opportunity for scientific study is huge, and any development of that land is a threat to that existing natural biodiversity in irreparable way;
  • The National Academy of Sciences has concluded that once oil and gas infrastructure are built in the Alaskan arctic region, it would be unlikely for that infrastructure to ever be removed or have the land be fully restored, as doing so would be immensely difficult and costly;
  • Anywhere that oil and gas drilling occurs opens up the threat of further environmental damage from oil spills, such as the recent BP oil leak in the North Slopes of Alaska that was caused by thawing permafrost; and
  • Not only do the direct effects of drilling for oil in ANWR need to be considered, but also the compounding effects that the eventual burning of that oil must be weighed. The use of the oil contained underground in Alaska will only serve to increase the effects of climate change in the Arctic, where temperatures already rise twice as quickly as the world average. The shores of Alaska are ground zero for the effects of climate change, with melting sea ice and rising sea levels causing additional concerns for survival of both wildlife and human populations that call Alaska home. The most climate-friendly way to treat the oil underneath ANWR would be to leave it in the ground.

Question 5: Can we do better to just install renewable energy resources instead of drilling in ANWR? How much capacity in renewable sources would be needed? How would the costs of renewable installations compare with ANWR drilling?

Part 1: Can we just install renewable energy instead of drilling?

At the crux of the original question was whether the country would be better off if we diverted resources away from ANWR drilling and instead developed comparable renewable energy sources. While this question is rooted in noble intent, the reality of the situation is that it would not always work in practice to swap the energy sources one-for-one.

Looking at the way in which petroleum (which includes all oils and liquid fuels derived from oil drilling) was used in the United States in 2016 using the below graphic that is created every year by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (a DOE national lab), we find that 35.9 quadrillion Btus (or quads) of petroleum were consumed. This massive sum of oil energy (more than the total primary energy, regardless of fuel type, consumed by any single country other than the United States and Canada in 2015) is broken down as 25.7 quads (72%) in the transportation sector, 8.12 quads (23%) in the industrial sector, 1.02 quads (3% in the residential sector, 0.88 quads (2%) in the commercial sector, and 0.24 quads (1%) in the electric power sector. Meanwhile, the 28.5 quads of natural gas goes 36% to the electric power sector, 34% to the industrial sector, 16% to the residential sector, 11% to the commercial sector, and 3% to the transportation sector.

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(side note– I think this is one of the most useful graphics created to understand the U.S. energy landscape every year. I have it printed and hanging at my desk and if you are trying to learn more about the different energy types and relative sizes of the energy sector then I recommend this as a great graphic to always have handy)

Compare this breakdown with some of the non-fossil fuels:

  • 100% of wind power (2.11 quads) goes to the electric power sector;
  • 99% of hydropower (2.48 quads) goes to the electric power sector, with the rest going to the industrial sector;
  • 70% of geothermal power (0.16 quads) goes to the electric power sector, with the rest going to the residential and commercial sectors (using geothermal as a heat source as a direct substitute for the electric power sector); and
  • 58% of solar power (0.34 quads) goes to the electric power sector, while 27% goes to residential sector (in the form of residential solar generation or solar heating, essentially a direct substitute for the electric power sector), 12% goes to the commercial sector (also basically a direct substitute for the electric power sector), and less than 1% goes to the industrial sector.

We see that renewable energy sources are capable of displacing a large chunk of the electric power sector, particularly the types of renewable sources like wind and solar that could be installed in vast open land like the original question asked. However, the oil and gas resources that are the subject of the ANWR debate are largely not powering electricity generation, and as such renewable energy sources cannot easily displace most of the uses of the oil and gas.

The issue with thinking ‘why don’t we not drill and instead just invest in renewable energy’ is that in today’s world, there are lots of uses of energy that can only be served, or at least can only be served optimally, by oil products. For example, renewable fuel replacements for jet fuel are not very promising on a one or two generation timescale and 43% of industrial heating applications require temperatures (above 750 degrees Fahrenheit) that cannot be met by electric means or renewable heating technologies. And regarding the millions of cars on the road, the most pervasive and entrenched oil use in daily life, the looming transition to electric vehicles is taking a long time for a reason– not the least of which is that gasoline’s energy density remains unmatched to deliver power in such a safe, economical, and space-efficient manner. Indeed when analysts or journalists speculate about the world using up all of the oil, what they’re really talking about is the transportation sector because other sectors already largely utilize other fuel types. So when considering where renewable energy can replace fossil fuels, it is important to note that the transportation sector and industrial sector are powered 95% and 72%, respectively, by oil and gas, and that there are sometimes technological, institutional, and infrastructure-related reasons for that that go beyond price and availability.

That said, we are experiencing the eventual shift of some energy uses away from fossil fuels– notably in the transportation sector– but many of these shifts will take time and money to convert infrastructure. Many continue to study and debate whether we’ll be able to convert to 100% renewable energy without the aid of fossil fuels (with some concluding it’s possible, others that it’s not), and if so how far away are we from such an energy landscape. Even considering that it will take 10 years from passing of legislation to beginning of actual ANWR oil production, the American energy mix is only expected to change so much in the next few decades (see the Energy Information Administration forecast for renewable energy, natural gas, and liquid oil fuels below), and for better or worse fossil fuels look to be a part of that mix.

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The most significant area in which renewable energy can continue to make headway is the electricity generation sector, the sector that is most suited for renewables even though they only account for 17% of total generation as of 2017. In the meantime, though, fossil fuels like oil and gas will play a crucial role in the energy markets and the potential windfall of resources laying readily underground will continue to be seen as valuable to oil and gas companies (though it is important to ask whether, in the midst of increasing availability of shale oil, will the energy markets need the ANWR oil or will the oil companies even want to gamble on the risky and expensive play).

Part 2: But theoretically, how much renewable energy would need to be installed to account for the energy that would be extracted from ANWR?

All that said, though, for the sake of the academic exercise originally asked, let’s ignore the differences between fuel types and assume that by leaving all the oil and gas from the 1002 Area in the ground and instead installing renewable energy sources (i.e., wind and solar farms) we can extract the same amount of energy for the same needs.

The 2008 DOE report estimated between 1.9 and 4.3 billion barrels of crude oil would be extracted in a developed ANWR. This amount of oil can be converted to between 10.5 and 23.9 quads. The peak extraction according to the DOE report would end up being between 867 and 2,464 gigawatt-hours (GWh) per day.

The 1998 USGS Survey pegged the technically recoverable pegged the technically recoverable natural gas at between 3.48 and 10.02 TCF, which easily converts to between 3.48 and 10.02 quads. Because the DOE report did not break down how much of the technically recoverable natural gas would actually be economical to extract, we’ll assume for simplicity’s sake that it all will be extracted (there’s enough uncertainty in the estimates in all of the USGS and DOE numbers that we need not worry about exactness, but rather make the estimates needed to get an order of magnitude estimate). Without any estimates about the rate of extraction expected from the natural gas, we’ll make a very back-of-the-envelope estimate that it will peak proportionally with oil and reach a maximum rate of 274 to 990 GWh per day.

Adding the cumulative crude oil and natural gas extracted from the 1002 Area would be between 14.0 and 33.9 quads— an amount of energy that would find itself somewhere between the total 2016 U.S. consumption of coal (14.2 quads) and petroleum (35.9 quads). Adding the peak rate of oil and gas extracted from ANWR would imply the total peak of oil plus natural gas of between 1,140 and 3,454 GWh per day (we’re again playing fast and loose with some natural gas assumptions here). This range of rates for the peak energy being pumped into the total U.S. energy supply will be the numbers used to compare with renewable energy rather than the cumulative energy extracted.*

*The reason for this is because it is the best basis of comparison we have to the renewable nature of solar and wind. Why is that? At first glance it would seem that once the cumulative fossil fuels are used up that the installed renewables would then really shine as their fuel is theoretically limitless. However that would be an oversimplification, as every solar panel and wind turbine is made from largely non-renewable sources and the technologies behind them have a limited lifespan (about 25 years for solar panels and 12 to 15 years for wind turbines). As such, every utility-scale renewable energy plant will need replacing in the future, likely repeatedly over the decades. So while the renewable energy sources will not dry up, it is still important to look at the sources from a daily or yearly capacity basis instead of cumulative energy production. Additionally, energy (whether oil or renewable energy) is not extracted and transported all at once, that process takes time. Because of this, energy markets center around the rate of energy delivery and not the cumulative energy delivery.

So given our target range of 1,140 to 3,454 GWh/day, how much solar or wind would need to be installed?

Solar

The reader who asked this question comes from prime solar power territory, so let’s start there. In 2013, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) released a report on how much land was used by solar power plants across the United States. With regards to the total area (meaning not just the solar panels but all of the required equipment, buildings, etc.), the generation-weighted average land use was between 2.8 and 5.3 acres per GWh per year, depending on the type of solar technology used. Using the most land-efficient technology (2.8 acres per GWh per year using increasingly common technology that tilts the solar panels to track the sun throughout the day), this amount of solar power would require about 1,166,000 to 3,530,000 acres, or about 4,700 to 14,300 square kilometers, of land.

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For reference, in the sun-bathed state of New Mexico, the largest city by land area is Albuquerque at 469 square kilometers. Given that, to equal peak potential oil output from the 1002 Area of ANWR woudl required solar power plant installations with land area about 10 to 30 times greater than Albuquerque. With the whole state of New Mexico totaling 314,258 square kilometers, the amount of land required for solar installations would be between 2 to 5% of New Mexico’s entire land area (put another way, the lower end of the land-requirement range is the size of Rhode Island and the upper end of the land-requirement range is the size of Connecticut).

Wind

Wind energy is set to take over as the number one American source of renewable energy by the end of 2019, a trend that is likely to continue in the future. One reason for the increasing capacity of U.S. wind power in the electric power sector is its ability to be installed both on land and in the water (i.e., onshore wind and offshore wind). Depending on whether the wind power installed is onshore or offshore, the efficiency, cost, and land-use requirements will vary.

NREL also conducted studies of the land-use requirements of wind energy. For both onshore and offshore wind installations, based on the existing wind projects studied, the wind power generating capacity per area (i.e., the capacity density) comes out to an average of 3.0 megawatts (MW) per square kilometer. As with the solar power land-use requirements, note that this figure goes beyond the theoretical space required by physics but includes all required equipment and land-use averaged across all projects.

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Operating at 100% capacity, that 3.0 MW per square kilometer would translate to 72 megatwatt-hours (MWh) produced per square kilometer each day. However utility scale wind power does not operate anywhere near 100% due to the prevalence of low wind speeds and changing directionality of winds, among other reasons. NREL’s Transparent Cost Database indicates that offshore wind operates at a median capacity factor of 43.00%, while onshore wind operates at a median of 40.35% capacity. Accounting for these figures, the land use of offshore wind energy comes out to 31.0 MWh per square kilometer per day, with onshore wind energy averaging 29.1 MWh per square kilometer per day. To reach the 1,140 and 3,454 GWh per day from peak-ANWR-oil would thus require about 33,000 to 100,000 square kilometers of area for offshore wind energy and about 35,000 to 107,000 square kilometers of land for onshore wind energy.

Using the same references points as with solar, wind energy resources would require an area roughly between 71 to 228 times the size of Albuquerque, between 11 and 34% the size of New Mexico, or a land-use requirement between the sizes of Maryland and Kentucky. It might seem jarring to realize just how much more land would be required for wind energy than solar energy, but multiple papers appear to support the notion that total land needed for utility-scale wind energy requires as much as six to eight times more land area than utility-scale solar energy on average. Indeed, the land-use required by renewable sources is one of the biggest costs of the energy at this time. If we’re willing to accept nuclear power as a source of clean, though not renewable, energy, then the technology currently outperforms them all by leaps and bounds– requiring 7 to 12 times less land than the same amount of solar power. But obviously nuclear power comes with its own set of political and environmental challenges, furthering the sentiment that there is not one and only one energy that will ever check all of the boxes and meet all of our needs.

Part 3: How would the costs of that scale of renewable energy sources compare with the previously discussed costs of drilling in ANWR?

Considering these results for the amount of land required by solar or wind energy resource to equal the peak oil and gas output of drilling in ANWR, the true scale of the potential energy resources underground the Alaska region really becomes clear. Further, it becomes clear just how difficult it would be to offset all of that potential energy by building utility-scale renewable energy generation. But the remaining question is how would the costs (both financial and environmental) of drilling in ANWR compare with the costs of the same capacity of renewable energy generation?

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Economically, the government (both state and federal) is only set to really profit from the drilling in ANWR because the area is government-owned and the money paid by the oil companies to lease the land for oil exploration would go directly to the government and because the government would also take a royalty on the profits made from said oil (a method to raise revenue also looking to be repeated in the sale of offshore drilling in almost all U.S. coastal waters). So while there will always be some degree of money provided to the government from renewable energy sources (e.g, through taxes), the land being used for our hypothetical vast solar or wind farms must come from the sale of government-owned land to provide the same sort of government revenue injection as drilling in ANWR. With wind power, at least, federally leasing for offshore wind farming has started to become somewhat common, though from 2013 to 2016 that only generated $16 million for the leasing of more than one million acres.

In terms of the noted benefits of helping U.S. energy trade by reducing the amount of oil that would need to be imported, the same can be said for a comparable amount of renewable energy– if that renewable energy is offsetting the import of fossil fuels, say for the electric power sector, then an equal effect on U.S. energy trade would be achieved.

In terms of the rough cost to install that amount of renewable energy, we can estimate total costs based on the levelized costs of energy (LCOE), which compares different methods of electricity generation based on costs to build, maintain, and fuel the plant over the lifetime. If we ignore the economic benefits that renewable energy sources enjoy from tax credits, the regionally-weighted LCOE’s of solar and wind power generation sources entering service in 2022 are 73.7 cents per MWh and 55.8 cents per MWh, respectively (compared with 96.2 cents per MWh for nuclear and 53.8 to 100.7 cents per MWh for natural gas, depending on the type of technology used). Compared with the total ANWR costs to extract of $123 billion to reach the 14.0 and 33.9 quads equivalent, the cost for solar would be between $3.0 billion and $7.3 billion and the cost for wind would be between $2.3 billion and $5.5 billion (again emphasizing the uncertainty in how much oil/gas is actually under ANWR as well as the very rough-estimate nature of these cost estimates). These numbers are just for the generation, not to mention the cost for transmission and distribution. However, with state-of-the-art renewable energy technology, it’s important to note that the costs are constantly decreasing and these estimates ignored the current tax credits allotted for renewable energy installations.

While renewable energy sources are seen as more environmentally friendly due to being carbon neutral, there are some environmental effects that cannot be ignored. Any energy source that takes up land is potentially displacing wildlife and using water and other resources. Further, just because the energy source is carbon neutral does not mean that the manufacturing, materials transportation, installation, or maintenance of those renewable plants are without emissions. Solar cells are also known to use some hazardous materials in their manufacturing. Regarding wind energy, extensive studies have had to be conducted on the danger wind turbines pose to birds, bats, and marine wildlife, though largely the conclusions of those studies has been that the impacts to such wildlife is low. Large wind turbines have also caused some concerns of public health regarding their sound and visual impact, but careful siting and planning is able to mitigate these concerns. So while the environmental effects of these renewable source are not nonexistent, they do appear to be much more manageable and avoidable than those of drilling for oil and gas.

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Conclusion

Even with the caveat that’s necessary to repeat throughout this post that all the numbers and calculations this analysis is based on are best-guess estimates and averages, much can be gleaned from looking at the results all together. Especially when you consider that the technologies involved for all discussed energy sources are constantly improving and each can be optimized for a particular region (such as using solar energy in lieu of wind energy in particularly sunny areas), the answer of how to best answer the energy future questions of the United States and the world is always going to be a strong mix of energy sources. There is no silver bullet, even among renewable energy resources, but rather heavy doses of appropriate renewable energy sources and nuclear energy sources will need to be mixed with the responsible use of fossil fuels for immediately visible future. Since the United States is quite unlikely to go cold turkey on fossil fuels overnight, the continued supply of crude oil products is going to be necessary for the time being. And the potential costs of largely relying on foreign imports to meet that demand are going to be feared by government and industry leaders alike. As such, it can be of no surprise that the massive resources of oil and gas underneath ANWR have been a continued focus of politicians and the oil industry for decades. However, none of that is to dismiss the legitimate environmental concerns the opponents have with sacrificing one of the last true areas of untouched wilderness in the United States to the predominantly-financial-based goals of drilling proponents, and if indeed the U.S. oil markets can prosper without drilling then that needs to be seriously considered.

The debate of whether or not to drill in ANWR is surrounded with so much uncertainty, along with passion on both sides. Because of this, the answer of what to do is not clear cut to many. The best thing you can do is educate yourself on the issues (I highly recommend a thorough read of the links in the ‘sources and additional reading’ section, as so much has been written about this topic that there is an unbelievable amount of information to learn) and stay informed as it evolves. Like it or not, drilling in ANWR is an inherently political debate and that affords all U.S. citizens the right, even the duty, to take your informed opinion and be active with it– call your Congressional representatives, join in the debate, donate to action groups. While the opening ANWR land for leasing to oil companies in the recently passed tax bill was the most significant action in this policy debate in years, the lengthy nature of the legislature and leasing process assures that the matter is anything but settled.

Sources and additional reading

About the author: Matt Chester is an energy analyst in Washington DC, studied engineering and science & technology policy at the University of Virginia, and operates this blog and website to share news, insights, and advice in the fields of energy policy, energy technology, and more. For more quick hits in addition to posts on this blog, follow him on Twitter @ChesterEnergy.  

Proposed Changes to Energy Conservation Standards Program for Appliances

When the Trump administration took office almost a year ago, one oft repeated promise was to remove and reduce regulations across the board– though environmental and energy regulations were frequently called out specifically. Whether it was in an attempt to boost American oil and coal industries or make complying with environmental regulations for facilities in the United States cheaper, the stated goal was always to prop up a situation that would put ‘America first.’

In recent weeks, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has started down a new path of cutting on regulation in the same intended vein. Specifically, DOE has signaled changes to come to the energy conservation standards program for appliances and other commercial and industrial products (otherwise known as the Appliance and Equipment Standards Program). What is the energy conservation program for appliances? What changes are being discussed? And how are energy advocacy groups responding? Keep reading to find out.



Background of Appliance and Equipment Standards Program

In its current form, the Appliance and Equipment Standards Program is mandated by the Energy Policy Conservation Act (EPCA), which requires DOE to set minimum energy conservation standards for over 60 consumer, commercial, and industrial products. Based on the standards that are set, companies must use the official test procedures (also established by DOE through formal rulemaking process) to test and certify that their products meet the minimum efficiency standards, while facing monetary punishments for every product knowingly shipped in violation of requirements. Not only that, but EPCA requires DOE to review the energy conservation standards and testing procedures for each of the applicable products every six years, surveying if and how the technology and market has changed, to determine if more stringent energy efficiency requirements are warranted (through its anti-backsliding provision, EPCA prevents DOE from walking back a future efficiency standard to be less stringent than one previously established). Also note that through this six-year review process, one of DOE’s possible (and not entirely uncommon) outcomes can be that the review is completed and the analysis dictates that more stringent standards are not feasible (whether it be because of an undue burden it would place on manufacturers, the lack of technological feasibility, the failure of potential standards to help consumers, etc.).

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These appliance and equipment energy standards were a hallmark of the Obama administration’s energy policy, having successfully implemented over 50 standards to save American household’s energy and also as a means towards reducing carbon emissions by at least 3 billion metric tons by 2030. Overall, the program as a whole has accounted for nearly $2 trillion in savings on American utility bills since inception in 1987. However as a part of the Trump administration’s efforts to roll back regulations across the board, energy efficiency standards have found themselves in the cross-hairs. Such efforts began early in the Trump presidency as several conservation standards that were pushed to completion in the last days of the Obama administration were subsequently put on hold and not published after Trump took office, while the DOE Secretary has identified the energy conservation program as ‘overly burdensome’ and ripe for reconsideration.

Impending changes

Starting at the end of November 2017, DOE began publicly weighing a complete overhaul of its Appliance and Equipment Standards Program. These changes would be the first significant reexamination of the DOE energy conservation standards program since the modern version of the law came to be in 1987, with the main stated goal of these changes being to allow for more flexibility.

Requests for Information

The first signal of these changes came in a Request for Information (RFI), wherein DOE proposed making these appliance standards more similar to corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards for motor vehicles. In these CAFE standards, car manufacturers can produce cars that fail to meet the set efficiency standards as long as the manufacturer also sells enough products that exceed the standards such that the average efficiency of the fleet meets the standards. Such a system is in contrast to the existing Appliance and Equipment Standards Program that requires all products to meet the mandatory levels. The RFI text states that ‘market-based policy mechanisms are potentially less burdensome alternatives as they use markets, price and other economic variables to provide incentives for regulated entities to reduce or eliminate negative environmental externalities in a least cost way.’ In addition to the option to average out product efficiency, this RFI also suggests such approaches as efficiency credit trading between manufacturers and ‘feebates’ that reward energy-efficient practices and penalize the failure to adhere to such practices.

As this first step in the rulemaking process (read about how the entire federal rulemaking process works here), DOE is soliciting feedback on how previously described market-oriented mechanisms, in contrast to the long-standing existing structure of the standards program, might be applied to the energy appliance standards program and how such programs have been successful elsewhere.

DOE also issued a second RFI later the same week as the first RFI to request feedback on its ongoing efforts to redesign the energy conservation standards program, specifically regarding the test procedures used to assess compliance with standards and the process used to establish standards. The proposed changes in this second RFI would be to allow establishing energy conservation standards through a quicker process of a negotiated rulemaking (which brings stakeholders in to essentially hammer out the standards with DOE, as opposed to the more extensive public back and forth from the existing rulemaking process), to establish additional means to solicit manufacturer feedback before a rulemaking process formally begins, using established industry standards for compliance testing (instead of continuing to set them through federal regulatory process), and requiring test procedures to be issued prior to the issuance of energy conservation standards.

Deferred action

In addition to the two RFIs, the Trump administration indefinitely deferred action on 20 appliance and equipment standards for household products (e.g., washing machines, refrigerators, and pool heaters) that are by law overdue for their updated review. While not subject to specific fanfare and announcement from the administration, this deferred action was signaled through changes to the Regulatory Agenda, removing the final action time for these 20 standards and placing them under the ‘long-term action’ label, meaning there is no expected regulatory action for these products over the next year.

Source

As an example, energy efficiency standards for commercial water heaters were proposed in 2016, with the legal deadline for a final rule (declaring whether more stringent standards for this product were warranted and, if so, what those standards would be) coming two years after the proposal. However those two years would pass as of May 2018, and since they are under the ‘long-term action’ umbrella, no action on them would occur at least until 2019 and the legal and statutory deadlines will be missed. This situation is similar for all 20 of the appliance and equipment standards that were placed under such deferred action, despite them all being marked as ‘under review’ during the regulatory agenda this past spring.

What is noteworthy about such a move is that, as previously stated, the six-year review for all standards can (and sometimes do) result in an analytical decision that more stringent energy efficiency standards are not warranted at a particular time. However, such decisions are rooted in extensive technological and market analysis, feedback from manufacturers and advocacy groups, and multiple series of proposals and reviews before a final decision is made (as is customary in the federal rulemaking process). But by choosing instead to not open up these standards for review, the measured analysis and thorough debate are prevented from even taking place on potential standards.

Response from energy advocates

In response to these proposed and impending alterations to how the appliance efficiency standards are set and regulated, a number of energy and environmental advocacy groups have made public statements about the effect they would have on future policy and American consumers.

Requests for information

An energy policy advocate at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) speculated that the proposed change to a CAFE-like standards program could lead to a dramatic reduction in American energy savings, while noting that the efficiency standards program must ‘be considered from the perspective of the consumers’ and that the ‘trading mechanisms DOE has proposed could lead to market confusion.’ A key difference between appliances and the automobile industry is that there are only a handful of very sophisticated car makers, whereas appliances have hundreds of manufacturers of all sizes and levels of energy expertise. The minimum efficiencies serve to protect consumers in situations where two products might look similar from the outside, but the energy use is vastly different due to the difference in manufacturer priorities and abilities. Further, the law behind the appliance standards mandates that standards are set at the ‘highest level that is technologically feasible and economically justified,’ not averaged across a suite of products. Adding in discussion of changing the process to set standards, NRDC also notes that the existing standards program is working well and has been for the 30 years of its existence. The desire to change it now, when nothing is broken, could ultimately do more harm than good and take away from the program that is currently working due to it being ‘straightforward, transparent, and easy for consumers to understand.’

Source

With regard to a shift to a CAFE-like system, a representative of the Appliance Standards Awareness Project (ASAP) expressed concern that such a switch would make the program more complex and difficult to follow, while ultimately opening it up for companies to game the system instead of the current system that puts the onus on the manufacturer to help the consumer save energy. The ASAP representative did, however, commend DOE for looking for ways to improve the Appliance and Equipment Standards Program instead of scrapping it completely and was reassured that the anti-backsliding provision would be effective in making sure existing standards never get weakened.

Deferred action

In its year-end review of energy policy, the NRDC identified the deferred action on the appliance standards as illegal based on the established statutory law, lamenting that in the end it is the American consumers who suffer. NRDC points out how essential such standards are and how important it is that they are reviewed and updated, as many products appear identical from the outside and standards ensure that consumers are getting a minimal level of efficiency. Looking at it economically, NRDC notes that standards implemented through 2016 save the average household $500 per year, while the continued implementation of the legally required standards (and improvements upon those standards) stand to save the country a cumulative $43 billion by 2035– but those savings are threatened if the deferred action continues. NRDC’s position is that all regulations are required by statute to be updated, and the “Trump DOE doesn’t get to pick and choose when to follow the law.”

Similarly, ASAP has noted that this deferred action is DOE indicating its intent to not follow the law, saying “I’ve never seen this before. They’re publishing a plan that flaunts the law. It’s a public plan basically thumbing its nose at congressional deadlines.” ASAP noted that while previous administrations, such as under George W. Bush, missed certain efficiency standard review deadlines, those administrations always appeared to be trying to complete its review and never punted on doing them at all as the Trump administration appears to be.

Lastly, ASAP and the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) put out a joint statement in response to the deferred action, noting that by “deciding not to honor statutory deadlines for these standards, DOE is jeopardizing billions of dollars in savings for American families and businesses, while also creating uncertainty for manufacturers and markets.” ASAP and ACEEE urge DOE to fulfill their statutory and legal obligations in continuing to review and update energy efficiency standards at the regulatory mandated six year intervals.

Next steps

With respect to deferred action, if these standards continue to be shelved against the legal requirements of EPCA, then organizations like NRDC will likely sue, as they’ve already done for several standards that were completed during the Obama administration but the Trump administration has failed to make official by publication in the Federal Register.

Regarding the two RFIs, comments are being accepted through February 16, 2018. While the previously noted press releases from advocacy groups will surely be repeated by those groups in public comment on record to the RFI docket, as well as additional comments from other groups and manufacturers, if these issues are important to you then be sure to submit a comment expressing your viewpoint as a concerned citizen (and consult this post on advice on how to make sure your public comment is read seriously and creates as much influence and impact as possible). In addition, DOE is hosting a public meeting for discussion of these RFIs with all interested stakeholders on January 9, 2018. These public meetings are opportunities for manufacturers, energy advocates, or any other interested parties to give feedback to DOE on the topics discussed in the RFIs. For more information on how to submit comments and about the public meeting, see the official RFI publication in the Federal Register.

Sources and additional reading

Agency floats overhaul of energy efficiency standards: EE News

Changes to the Standards Program: More Harm than Good? NRDC

Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions: Executive Office of the President

Department of Energy Issues Second Request for Information (RFI) on Proposed Changes to its Appliance Standards Program: Lexology

Department of Energy Solicits Comments on a Major Rest of its Appliance Standards Program: Lexology

Defending Efficiency Standards: 2017 In Review: NRDC

DOE mulls changes to appliance efficiency program: Utility Dive

Procedures, Interpretations, and Policies for Consideration of New or Revised Energy Conservation Standards for Consumer Products: Federal Register

Statement of ACEEE and ASAP on Federal Plans to Put Updates to Appliance Standards on Ice: ACEEE

The $2 Trillion Success Story: Energy Efficiency Standards: NRDC

Trump administration ignores legal mandates to update appliance efficiency standards: ThinkProgress

About the author: Matt Chester is an energy analyst in Washington DC, studied engineering and science & technology policy at the University of Virginia, and operates this blog and website to share news, insights, and advice in the fields of energy policy, energy technology, and more. For more quick hits in addition to posts on this blog, follow him on Twitter @ChesterEnergy.  

President Obama’s Energy and Environmental Legacy

In the Fall 2016 issue of The Current, the quarterly online magazine from the Women’s Council on Energy and the Environment (WCEE), I wrote a retrospective on now-former President Obama’s energy and environmental legacy as compared with his campaign promises. The main conclusion of that article was that Obama was leaving office with mixed results when it came to delivering on his stated goals in the energy and environmental spheres, and that the long-term legacy of those achievements would rest on the action or inaction of his yet-to-be-determined successor. With about a year having passed since publication of that article, and almost eight months for President Trump to have set the course for his energy and environmental agenda, I thought it would be interested to see how some of the initial conclusions have held up and how the new administration has followed up on those specific issues.



A quick note that this article will be slightly more politically based than I intend to take typically in this outlet. The goal of this blog will be to provide more straightforward information and analysis based in data, rather than take a side on any specific partisan debate. I want to give you the information and tools, and you can interpret it however you choose. However because this deals with an article that was already published, I thought it might be worth checking into the facts again after a year.

The makeup of the national energy supply

Obama campaign promise: Clean coal and nuclear power will find a place to stay

Conclusion in initial article: Mixed results— Clean coal remains elusive; nuclear was showing promise under the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Clean Power Plan (CPP), which ended up getting stalled until courts could review

Update: Progress has been further stalled— Pushing of clean coal to revitalize the coal industry has long been a part of President Trump’s energy plan. However there has not been appreciable increases in the implementation of clean coal—and the construction of a first-of-its-kind clean coal power plant in Mississippi was indefinitely suspended after falling far behind schedule and beyond budget.

When it comes to the CPP, the Trump administration has moved forward on its campaign promise to roll it back. In March, EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt informed states that they are not obligated to meet the deadlines set by the CPP while was still stalled in the judicial system.

The overall result is that the push to increase the portion of the nation’s energy supply made up by clean coal and nuclear power has stalled. The energy-related carbon dioxide intensity of coal has remained steady for years, indicating the proportion of ‘clean coal’ to total coal has not made significant gains. Similarly the below graph shows that the total power generation from nuclear, as well as the percentage of overall American energy generation attributed to nuclear, has remained steady for the last decade.

Based on Short-Term Energy Outlook data from Energy Information Administration (EIA) as of September 6, 2017—annual data for 2017 and 2018 are projections.

Based on Short-Term Energy Outlook data from Energy Information Administration (EIA) as of September 6, 2017—annual data for 2017 and 2018 are projections.

Clean tech investment and job growth

Obama campaign promise: Invest $150 billion over 10 years to deploy clean technologies and create millions of new jobs

Conclusion in initial article: Partially successful— the investment was exceeded by 2014, but the number of jobs created in the space fell well short of millions

Update: Inconclusive—For the entirety of Obama’s second term and since the Trump administration has taken office, the U.S. economy has consistently added jobs every month. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped providing data on “green jobs” in 2013. In absence of this monthly data, the best source to track jobs in the clean tech space is the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) U.S. Energy and Employment Report, issued annually in January. As such, it is impossible to know if the new jobs added to the economy are in the clean technologies, though some industry and government leaders have expressed concern that the Trump decision to pull out of the Paris climate change agreement will negatively impact the prospects for clean tech growth and employment.

Renewable electricity

Obama campaign promise: Increase percentage of electricity generated from renewable sources to 10% by 2012 and 25% by 2025

Conclusion in initial article: Mostly successful— reached 12% by 2012 but plateaued at about 13% through 2015

Update: Progress being made—While the Trump Administration has not focused on policies to specifically encourage renewable energy policies, market forces continue to encourage the penetration of renewable electricity generation. Annual data showed renewable energy generation reaching 15% in 2016 with EIA forecasting that to increase to 17% in 2017 and 16% in 2018.

Based on Short-Term Energy Outlook data from Energy Information Administration (EIA) as of September 6, 2017—annual data for 2017 and 2018 are projections.

 

Industrial energy efficiency

Obama campaign promise: Promote energy efficiency with industrial manufacturers

Conclusion in initial article: Awaiting results— Obama issued an executive order in 2010 that would achieve $100 billion in energy savings, but the results were to be measured over the following 10 years

Update: Still waiting—Obviously a one year update won’t change the conclusion that these results were still be measured over 10 years, which have not yet passed, so we’ll still await the outcome of this one. While no actions have been taken by President Trump to undue the executive order fulfilling Obama’s campaign promise focusing on national energy efficiency, it is noteworthy that President Trump’s approach to national energy issues has instead been to roll back regulations seen as impeding the development of U.S. energy resources (focusing on oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy).

Government support of oil companies

Obama campaign promise: Eliminate tax breaks to big oil companies

Conclusion in initial article: No progress— Obama’s attempt to eliminate oil tax breaks were rejected by Congress for all of Obama’s proposed budgets

Update: No expected progress– President Trump’s priorities are notably different than Obama’s were, so the status quo of the tax breaks for oil companies are wholly expected to persist, as doing otherwise would not be seen as progress by Trump. On the contrary, there has been speculation of Trump expanding government aid to prop up the coal industry as well. These actions would keep with a worldwide trend according to a recent report by the International Monetary Fund that concluded fossil fuel subsidies, at $5.5 trillion annually, account for 6.5% of the global GDP.

Carbon emissions

Obama campaign promise: Make significant progress to reduce the national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions

Conclusion in initial article: Jury still out— CPP would reduce CO2 emissions from power plants for the first time, but the Supreme Court placed a hold on the implementation

Update: As noted earlier, one of Obama’s signature energy accomplishments in the CPP is on life support after the Trump administration signaled to states that they would not be held to the emission requirements. However, U.S. CO2 emissions might be another area where the market forces are already in play to affect the outcome regardless of executive action or inaction. The below two graphs from EIA show a forecast continued drop in CO2 emissions per capita and a drastic drop in total CO2 emissions from a peak in 2019 to a minimum in 2033 (before again increasing due to growing population levels). This drop in CO2 emissions in the absence of federal policy comes because of the continuously falling price of less carbon intensive fuels such as natural gas, nuclear, and renewable energy sources compared with coal and petroleum, in addition to individual states and companies pledging to reduce emissions regardless of whether or not the CPP becomes law.

EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook
EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook

Conclusion

Obama was elected after campaigning on addressing climate change and promising federal action to reduce impacts of the energy sector. Upon his imminent departure from office, giving him a grade on fulfilling his campaign promises proved difficult due to some of the long-term nature of potential results as well as the impact his successor could potentially have on furthering or rolling back parts of his agenda. With the benefit of another year to reflect upon, the conclusion of Obama’s legacy as being overall mixed seems even more entrenched due to the contrasting views held by President Trump. While the dominoes of some of his actions (such as federal investment in clean tech and industrial energy efficiency) are still falling, some of his more ambitious attempts (namely the Clean Power Plan and the Paris climate agreement) have been thwarted by the Trump administration.

If you’re interested in watching the energy makeup of the United States, the relative carbon emissions, or the overall total energy used across the nation, stay tuned for a primer I’m planning on the EIA’s vast public datasets to show you how you can find that raw data yourself.

 

 

 

About the author: Matt Chester is an energy analyst in Washington DC, studied engineering and science & technology policy at the University of Virginia, and operates this blog and website to share news, insights, and advice in the fields of energy policy, energy technology, and more. For more quick hits in addition to posts on this blog, follow him on Twitter @ChesterEnergy.